In May 1982, the British government requisitioned numerous private vessels, including the transatlantic liner the RMS Queen Elizabeth 2, for use during the Falklands (Malvinas) War. In taking up ships from trade, the rules contained in the 1907 Hague Convention VII relating to the conversion of merchant ships into warships afforded some guidance to Britain. This article reviews the development of the use made by governments of private ships during wartime, the need for Hague Convention VII, and the relevance of that Convention to the British requisition exercise undertaken in 1982.
Introduction
intended to abolish privateering once and for all. 11 Formal conversion also served to distinguish between those ships entitled to use lawful military force and those which were not, and thereby to attribute state responsibility for infractions of naval warfare. 12 The British government turned quickly to private shipping in early April 1982 on the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, but mere requisition alone did not convert the STUFT into fullycommissioned warships. Requisition therefore raises serious questions as to the precise status of the STUFT in terms of the rules of armed conflict generally, and of Hague Convention VII, in particular.
In view of the enduring importance of the merchant marine and its trained personnel in modern warfare, the structure of this discussion is as follows. First, a short, general background to the 1907 Hague Convention VII is provided, after which subsequent developments are outlined. The requisition procedure utilised by the British government to convert the STUFT, and specifically, the QE2, for auxiliary use in the Falklands, is then critiqued. It is concluded that a gap in practice between the formalities of Hague Convention VII and mere requisition attracted unnecessary risks. 
Merchant Ship Conversion in Wartime
1907
(citation omitted).

5
Background to Hague Convention VII Prior to 1856, states typically turned to privateers on the outbreak of war to increase their sea-power rapidly. Privateers were privatelyowned vessels awarded official commissions (or, letters of marque) by a belligerent state. 13 The commissioning of privateers entitled such ships to use offensive force on the high seas, and thus differentiated their acts from acts of piracy. While privateers were authorised to attack all opposing belligerent ships, they generally exercised their rights to use force on the high seas to interrupt trade, and to capture cargoes and ships as "prize". 14 Most importantly, the profits from the sale of prize were subsequently divided between a belligerent state and the privateer, which afforded a private profit motive to public war.
Privateering was thus profitable, yet costly in legal and diplomatic terms as controversial or unlawful seizures of prize could readily be perceived as piracy. 15 Thus, over time, privateers acquired a reputation "as tending to encourage a spirit of lawless depredation". 16 The lure of private profit did nothing to professionalise warfare, and sporadic efforts were made to abolish privateering. For example, 13 J. Westlake, International Law, Part II (War) (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1913), p. 177. Letters of marque derive from the system of reprisals.
Ibid., pp. 9, 12.
14 Plunder, effectively, the seizure of which was subject to subsequent adjudication in prize courts. 15 The distinction between piracy and privateering goes to jurisdiction. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904 -1905) , two Russian ships belonging to the auxiliary navy were authorised by the Turkish Sultan to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as merchant ships. Then they transited across the Suez Canal and were subsequently converted into warships in order to exercise the right of visit and search on neutral shipping; thereupon they captured a British ship. 24 As only belligerent warships had undisputed rights to stop, search and capture ships during naval warfare, belligerent merchant ships involved in trade or assisting as auxiliaries had no clear right to do likewise. In turn, the treatment of all intercepted ships depended on whether they were merely engaged in trade, were acting as enemy auxiliaries, or were enemy warships. Nonetheless, lingering uncertainties in practice remained, and formal requirements for merchant ship conversion into warships were finally tabled for consideration at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907.
The Second Hague Peace Conference A system of mutual disarmament was an important aspiration underlying both Peace Conferences convened in The Hague, in 1899 and 1907, respectively, but that topic was so deeply controversial in a world of industrial competition that the Russian government had to omit it from the 1907 programme entirely, leaving it as "unfinished 24 G. Venturini, supra note 12, p. 120 (ship names and citations omitted). 9 business". 25 The second purpose of each conference -to ensure greater humanitarian protections during times of war -succeeded far better. Due in no large part to the extension of the suffrage, 26 the impetus at the time was to humanise war to the greatest extent possible. 27 As it had also long been felt that naval practice needed to provide for similarly rigorous rules and/or protections as those provided for the participants in war on land, maritime warfare formed the central focus at The Hague in 1907. 
Convention VII
The delegates of 44 states assembled at The Hague in June 1907 were divided into six commissions, as well as sub-commissions and committees of examination. The Commission on Maritime Law, termed the "IV Commission", was not subdivided; the specific remit of its 114 members was to discuss any questions concerning maritime Werner, "Les prisonniers de guerre", Recueil des Cours, Vol. 21 (1928) 5, 13 -14. warfare not dealt with by the III Commission of War on Sea. 32 The topic of "merchant ships transformed into cruisers", or warships, was the first one assigned to the IV Commission, the president of which was the Russian delegate, Professor de Martens. 33 In fact, no member of the IV Commission was opposed to the practice of conversion, 34 but a central difficulty in standardising procedure was the imperative to maintain a fundamental distinction between conversion and privateering, as merchant ships engaged in normal commerce could have no combatant rights, at least until forced to act in self-defence. 35 Other proposals left open were the types of eligible vessels, the place and the required duration of conversion. 36 Ultimately, Convention VII on the lawful conversion of merchant ships was adopted by the IV Commission, with six abstentions; in the plenary session of the Conference, 32 delegates fully approved it. 37 The main stipulations in the Convention were a mere six, each of 32 W. I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 32. 33 See, e.g., V.V. Pustogarov, "Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845 -1909 ) -a humanist of modern times", I.R.R.C., Vol. 312 (1996) The six rules of Convention VII went some way towards affording a more transparent public status to converted merchant ships. Further, by requiring a converted ship to be placed "under the direct authority", etc., of a belligerent state, the Convention was designed to discourage any indirect renewal of privateering. 39 Specifically, any attempt to "depredate" could both obviate and incur belligerent state obligations to pay compensation, depending on the circumstances. 40 Standards were even more precise in the relations 38 Article 7 contains the "general participation clause", standard at the time. See supra note 26. 39 W.I. Hull, supra note 7, p. 484 n. 1: the United States neither signed nor ratified Convention VII due to its stance regarding the capture of private property at sea. and unlawful combatants could be treated as war criminals. From the humanitarian basis of the non-combatant/combatant distinction flowed a further Hague rule: that of proportionality, in that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited", and unnecessary suffering and damage were to be avoided. 46 Only that force required to over-power the enemy was permitted, 47 but state responsibility for infractions of war law remained tightly circumscribed, not least on the basis of the "general participation clause". 48 However, and quite apart from the question of arming merchant ships for mere defensive purposes, e.g., against pirates, 49 if a merchant ship utilised force in a public war when its entitlement to do so was in doubt, its crew could be treated as unlawful combatants or 44 See, e.g., Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Articles 1 and 2, but see also Article 3 (non-combatants may also form part of a belligerent"s armed forces). Article 7. The names of all individuals free on parole must be notified to the enemy, which is then forbidden to employ them for any service prohibited by the terms of parole.
Otherwise, Article 8 removed these protections from "ships taking part in the hostilities", e.g., the crew of auxiliary ships. 50 H. Lauterpacht, supra note 22, p. 467. The term "war crime" at the time was defined in a military and legal sense as, inter alia, illegitimate armed hostilities committed by individuals who were not members of the armed forces. See Col. J.E. Edmonds and L.
Oppenheim, supra note 31, Paras. 441 -442. 51 The German view was that resistance was unlawful. H. In short, the strict contours of Hague Convention VII may have helped to "bring all naval combatants within the rules adopted for the humanising of warfare", 54 but the result in combination with other Hague rules, was as follows: first, the officers and crew of enemy warships were to be treated as lawful combatants; secondly, those serving on enemy merchant ships which employed force in selfdefence might be treated as lawful combatants. As for unincorporated enemy auxiliaries vessels deemed to have employed offensive force without lawful authority, no special protections existed. 55 It was expected that gaps in coverage would be filled by reference to custom and accepted military usage. The formalities of Hague Convention VII for converted merchant ships are found in Articles 3 to 8 of the Oxford Manual, but in relation to the place of conversion, a matter left unresolved in 1907, Article 9 specified that 57 Relative to the creation of an international prize court (never in force). 58 See, e.g., E. Chadwick, "The "Impossibility" of Maritime Neutrality During World War 1", in supra note 1, at p. 337. 59 The Institute was established in Belgium in 1873 by eminent jurists including Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Tobias Asser, and K. The conversion of a vessel into a warship may be accomplished by a belligerent only in its own waters, in those of an allied state also a belligerent, in those of the adversary, or, lastly, in those of a territory occupied by the troops of one of these states.
Subsequent developments
Thus, lawful conversion could not occur on the high seas, or in neutral or other non-aligned state waters. Article 10 prohibited the re-conversion of a warship back into a public or private vessel for the duration of the hostilities. Article 12 reiterated the prohibition of privateering, and specified the following parameters for the use of offensive force:
Apart from the conditions laid down …, neither public nor private vessels, nor their personnel, may commit acts of hostility against the enemy. Both may, however, use force to defend themselves against the attack of an enemy vessel. 61 For those found to have assisted the hostilities unlawfully, the following provisions were made:
Article 60. When a public or a private ship has directly or indirectly taken part in the hostilities, the enemy may retain as prisoners of war the whole personnel of the ship, without prejudice to the penalties he might otherwise incur. Necessary modifications to the STUFT required as few as two or three days, 90 and somewhat longer in some cases. 91 Within seven weeks, a task force of 28000 men and over 100 ships in total had been assembled, and sent to the Falklands. 92 The conflict between Argentina and Britain over the islands was The ship was fitted with two helipads, after large parts of the superstructure were sliced away. It received refuelling-at-sea gear for fuel and water supplies, and additional communications equipment.
Accommodation was increased by 1000 camp beds to carry 3150 service personnel from 5 Infantry Brigade, 117 and it was loaded with large quantities of stores totalling 71 tons. Defensive protection, e.g., against magnetic mines, was supplied. Captain Peter Jackson was placed in command, 118 but he, unlike most Cunard officers, was not in the Royal Navy Reserve, and the liner continued to display the Red As war between belligerents can be waged anywhere on the high seas, the QE2 was vulnerable to attack throughout the journey. By continuing to fly the Red Ensign to signal what it considered to be its non-combatant status, the QE2 should in theory have invited less curiosity, but the public nature of its departure from Southampton and its assigned duties as a troop ship made it an important Argentine military objective. Allegedly, Argentina employed a Boeing 707 to search for it in the South Atlantic. 123 To better conceal its identity, the QE2"s windows were blacked-out after departing Ascension (roughly, the half-way point). 124 The liner had brushes with extreme danger, including acutely-low visibility due to fog; as it neared the war zone, its radar was switched off and it navigated massive iceberg fields in the vicinity of South Georgia without it, where it offloaded troops onto other vessels on 28 May. The following day, the 
Further Developments
In view of practices adopted in modern naval confrontations, the San The San Remo guidelines thus make it increasingly difficult to argue that Britain"s requisition exercise should have been more in compliance with Hague Convention VII, as the formal requirements of the 1907 Convention appear increasingly irrelevant to modern naval warfare. However, the proportionality principle has been strengthened. In other words, were a belligerent today to consider outright destruction of a ship like the QE2, modern practice would certainly permit it if the ship were to be deemed a military objective capable of affording a concrete military advantage. However, this could have been said about any British ship encountered at sea during the war, including the STUFT, and one requisitioned vessel was in fact destroyed. 153 Nonetheless, even were a war such as that which occurred over the Falklands to be re-played today, it remains the case that ship destruction is never automatically required and is instead only rarely necessary, depending of course on the applicable rules of engagement and available target information. 154
Conclusion
Modern laws of war owe their development generally to wider societal influences which have broadened political accountability for war itself. 
